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1. Introduction 
Over ten years ago David Clarke and I proposed what we then called the 
MES or Metasemantic Expert System to account for the use of metaphors and 
metonymies  in  ordinary  discourse  (Nerlich  &  Clarke  1988;  1992a;  Nerlich 
1989). We represented it in the following way: 
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After  a  five  year  interlude,  when  we
1  concentrated  on  discovering  the 
historical antecedents of modern semantic and pragmatic theories of language, 
we  have  started  to  fill  in  some  gaps  that  were  left  open,  intentionally  or 
unintentionally  in  this  initial  model.  We  bolstered  some  links  with  modern 
theories of cognitive semantics, with research into conceptual metaphors and 
metonymies and prototype theory (Nerlich & Clarke 1992a), especially shifts in 
prototypes (Nerlich & Clarke 1992b); we explored a third component of the 
MES, synecdoche (Nerlich & Clarke 1999; Nerlich & Clarke 2000); we also 
examined some-long term effects of the use of the MES, polysemy (Nerlich & 
Clarke  1997),  and  looked  at  the  uses  people  make  of  polysemy  in  ordinary 
discourse (Nerlich & Clarke 2001; Nerlich & Chamizo Dominguez 1999); and 
finally, we tried to find out how the MES or rather a competence for figurative 
language use and the exploitation of polysemy could be acquired in semantic 
development  (Nerlich,  Todd  &  Clarke  1998;  Nerlich,  Todd  &  Clarke  1999; 
Nerlich, Todd & Clarke, in prep.). More recently we have begun to take account 
of research into blending, mainly fostered by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner 
(Nerlich & Clarke 2000). 
In this article we shall focus on certain facets of our historiographical and 
our theoretical research, and try to show how both strands can contribute to a 
new understanding of semantic change and semantic development. The issue of 
‘blending’ will give us an opportunity to explore links between the present and 
the past. Our research into language acquisition might open up possible links 
between the present and the future. 
2. Blending the past and the present 
Theories  of  ‘blending’  were  developed  in  cognitive  linguistics  in  an 
attempt  to  model  the  processes  of  metaphor  creation  and  understanding. 
Almost twenty years ago George Lakoff and others first put forward a two-
domain model in which a conventional conceptual metaphor is seen as a partial 
mapping of one conceptual gestalt-structure or source-concept, e.g. JOURNEY 
onto another conceptual gestalt-structure, the target-concept, e.g. LOVE. This 
means that  the source domain,  say JOURNEY  projects information  directly 
onto  the  target  domain,  say  LOVE,  through  structural  transfer  (see  Oakley 
1998:325). They loved each other to the ends of the earth is an example of an 
 
1  Brigitte  Nerlich  &  David  D.  Clarke,  School  of  Psychology,  University  of  Nottingham. 
University  Park  Campus,  Nottingham  NG7  2RD,  UK.  This  paper  has  been  reprinted  with 
permission  of:  Regine  Eckardt  &  Klaus  von  Heusinger  (eds.).  Meaning  Change  –  Meaning 
Variation.  Workshop  held  at  Konstanz,  Feb.  1999,  Vol.  1.  Konstanz:  Fachbereich 
Sprachwissenschaft der Universität Konstanz, Arbeitspapier Nr. 106, 123–134.   
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utterance based on this type of conceptual projection. The target concept of 
LOVE can also be metaphorically structured by other source-concepts such as 
WAR or MADNESS.  
Another example would be the transfer of human characteristics, such as 
being able to recognise somebody or something, to the domain of computers. We 
might say, for example: My computer doesn’t seem to recognise this new printer, 
when trying to print out an urgent letter. And going one step further, we can 
create a meta-metaphor and say: I wish we were back in the good old days when 
pens  recognised  paper  and  when  paper  recognised  envelopes.  Here  the 
conventionalised computer metaphor is transferred to the ‘novel’ domain of pen-
and-paper communication, that is, letter writing in the good old sense of the 
word (for this example, see Laurie Taylor, Times Higher Education Supplement, 
15 January, 1999, p. 60). 
In contrast to Lakoff’s early models of metaphor, Fauconnier and Turner are 
now working with a whole array of mental spaces (see Fauconnier 1998), and 
blending is seen to occur when two or more input spaces in cooperation with a 
generic space project partial structure into a fourth space known as the blend, the 
blend inheriting partial structure from each input space and developing its own 
emergent structure (Oakley 1998:326). In 1996 Mark Turner expressed a central 
assumption underlying this type of blending research in the following way: 
Meanings are not mental objects bounded in conceptual places but rather complex operations 
of projection, binding, linking, blending, and integration over multiple spaces. (Turner 1996:57) 
To  fully  understand the  import  of  the  concept  of blending  or  conceptual 
integration for contemporary semantic thought, it might be useful to reconstruct 
the  contexts  in  which  those  concepts  appeared,  albeit  sometimes  in  a  veiled 
form,  for  the  first  time  (see  Nerlich  &  Clarke  2000;  some  of  the  following 
overlaps with this article). We hope that such a reconstruction may lead to a 
critical  evaluation  of  contemporary  concepts  and  theories.  For  theories  of 
blending to develop a few preconditions must be fulfilled:  
·  The view that language is a mere instrument for the representation of thought 
has to be replaced by a view according to which thought and language are 
intricately linked up with one another, and according to which they structure 
each other mutually. 
·  The view of word meaning as being based on a one-to-one fixed mapping 
relation  between  a  word  and  a  well-defined  object  or  concept  must  be 
abandoned  for  a  view  of  meaning  as  having  fuzzy  boundaries,  as  being 
elastic and context-sensitive. 
·  The view of word meaning as pinpointing a real or ideal object or concept 
must be replaced by a view of word meaning as delimiting a roughly drawn 
and changeable ‘area of meaning(s)’.  
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·  The view that sentence meaning is the sum of the meanings of the words 
used must be replaced by a view of sentence meaning as being the result of 
integrational  and  inferential  processes  feeding  on  clues  other  than  those 
contained in the meaning of each word in isolation, that is, clues arising 
from the co-text of the sentence and the wider context of the situation of 
discourse (the situation of perception, memory, discourse, and culture). 
·  The  view  that  there  is  a  radical  distinction  between  the  literal  and  the 
metaphorical in grammar and semantics has to be replaced by the view that 
language (and thought) are metaphorical through and through (see Schmitz 
1985; Gibbs 1994; Schumacher 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
All these insights into the construction of meaning were in the air before and 
during the 19th century and are not the reserve of the 20th century alone (see 
Smith  1982;  Nerlich  1992;  for  a  summary  of  what  cognitive  linguists  know 
about their predecessors, see now Mark Turner’s contribution to the cogling list, 
30 January, 1999: X-UIDL: 284bda4409504c43ad4da2924844ab36). However, 
these  views  needed  to  be  pitched  against  other  dominant  views  (e.g.  truth 
conditional and/or componential semantics) to lead to a real scientific revolution. 
This only happened in the last part of this century. 
The main foundations for a dynamic conception of meaning were laid in the 
18th century with the works of Giambattista Vico and Du Marsais, for example. 
They both, in different ways, held the view that metaphor was not an artifice of 
language  but  a  natural  way  of  expressing  and  talking  about  the  world  (see 
Nerlich  1998). They  overthrew  the then  predominant  view  of  metaphor  as  a 
dangerous impediment to the clear transmission or communication of thoughts. 
This view had still been held by Locke, a philosopher who, ironically, boosted 
metaphor  research  by  pointing  out  that  our  basic  mentalistic  concepts  are 
metaphorical in origin (Leary 1990:14). Quite insidiously, the insight into the 
metaphorical nature of some words and concepts, such as spirit, undermined the 
representational view of language. And once liberated from the single function of 
representing things or thoughts, language could become the free possession and 
tool of the communicating subject. The language user could come into focus 
instead of the language, and this again facilitated social, cognitive, and pragmatic 
insights into language and meaning. 
The 18th-century insights into the nature of meaning and metaphor had a 
profound effect on the philosophies of language elaborated in the 19th and early 
20th centuries which all offered alternative avenues of attack on the problem of 
meaning.  After  centuries  of  philosophical  disparagement,  the  crucial  role  of 
metaphor in language and in the structuring of thought was recognized by the 
likes  of  Herder  and  Humboldt,  Goethe  and  Gerber,  Nietzsche  and  Biese, 
Wegener and Gardiner, Mauthner and Stählin, setting the stage for such 20th-
century  developments  as  Bühler’s  (1934)  declaration  that  metaphor  is 
fundamental to all concept formation (see Nerlich & Clarke, in press).   
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By the beginning of the 20th century, a theory of metaphor as blending was 
very  much  in  the  air,  sparked  off,  perhaps,  by  Philipp  Wegener’s  work 
(Wegener  1885). A  fan  of  Wegener’s  and  an  acquaintance  of  Bühler’s,  the 
Egyptologist Alan Henderson Gardiner, pointed out, in his book A Theory of 
Speech and Language (Gardiner 1932) that under the guidance of the situation 
of discourse the meaning of a word or a sentence emerges as a fusion between 
the traditional range of meanings of the word and the thing-meant, between 
what is said and what is meant. The process of fusion or as Gardiner says, 
blending (p. 169), is most spectacular in the case of metaphor. This can be 
illustrated with the following examples (not taken from Gardiner):  
 
plants hum an s
seminary
nursery
'seed-bed' 'type of sch ool'
'kin dergarten' 'garden centre'
can m ean
can m ean
direction of m etaph orical transfer
direction of m etaph orical transfer
source/
target
source/
target
 
 
How you ‘concoct’ your metaphor or your blend depends on the available 
lexical resources, the communicative needs, and the context of discourse. 
Going one step beyond Gardiner in his Theory of Language (Bühler 1934), 
Bühler wanted to find the sematological core of a well-constructed theory of 
the metaphor (Bühler 1934/1990:392/343). And this semiotic core lies in the 
fact  that  in  metaphor  production  and  understanding  we  are  dealing  with  a 
mixing of spheres, Sphärenmischung, that is, with the blending of linguistic 
and  non-linguistic  knowledge.  Bühler’s  most  favourite  example  is  the 
metaphor of a butterfly ‘knitting socks’ – a metaphorical description of the 
movement of its antennae.  
 
A duality of spheres [...] and something like a transition from one to the other can often be 
detected in the experience [of understanding], and this often vanishes only when idiomatically 
familiar constructions are involved. (Bühler 1934/1990:392–393/343)  
 
Bühler compares this process of blending with binocular vision or with a visual 
projection that passes through two filters covering each other partially.  
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Another  less  well  known  psychologist  of  (religious)  language,  Gustav 
Stählin was also interested in metaphor and especially in metaphor as one of the 
psychological processes involved in language change (see Schumacher 1997). 
He too developed a theory of ‘blending’ as a by-product. What Lakoff calls target 
domain,  Stählin  called  Sache,  and  what  Lakoff  calls  source  domain,  Stählin 
called Bild. 
 [...]  der  metaphorische  Ausdruck  steht  jedesmal  in  einer  gewissen  Spannung  mit  dem 
Zusammenhang. Er stammt aus einem Gebiet, von dem hier nicht die Rede ist, und wird auf ein 
Gebiet angewendet, auf dem er nicht daheim ist. Er ist der Name eines Gegenstandes, der hier gar 
nicht “gemeint” ist, und muß erst übertragen werden auf den Gegenstand, der hier in Rede steht. 
Er ist ein Fremdkörper in dem Zusammenhang und kann mindestens als solcher zum Bewußtsein 
kommen. (Stählin 1913:321–322) 
[...] kurzum: ich ziehe nicht nur das Bild in die Sphäre des Sachgegenstandes, sondern auch die 
Sache in die Sphäre des Bildes hinein. Es findet ein Austausch der Merkmale, eine Vereinigung der 
beiderseitigen Sphären, eine Verschmelzung von Bild und Sache statt. (Stählin 1913:324) 
In  the  1970s  and  1980s  the  theoretical  and  empirical  work  on  metaphor 
accomplished  by  Bühler  and  Stählin  was  rediscovered  and  compared  to  the 
interaction theory of metaphor developed by Richards and Black. Nowadays, one 
can  see  similarities  between  the  older  theories  of  metaphor  and  the  newer 
cognitive  theories  of  metaphor  and  blending.  There  are,  however,  a  few 
differences. The older theories of blending are all limited to the two domain 
model.  The  more  elaborate  multi-space  model  developed  by  Turner  and 
Fauconnier eludes them. 
And  yet,  one  should  not  forget  that  others  before  Lakoff,  Turner  and 
Fauconnier had begun to tell the tale of the metaphoricity of language and the 
embodiment  of  thought.  These  investigations  were  interrupted  in  the  middle 
portion  of  this  century  by  the  Second  World  War  as  well  as  by  the  rise  of 
behaviourism,  positivism  and  structuralism(s).  Retelling  the  story  of  these 
beginnings of a theory of blending might give modern theories firmer roots, roots 
that might prevent them from being swept away by the next wave of positivism 
and reductionism. 
We  have  looked  at  some  examples  of  a  psychological  investigation  of 
metaphor at the turn from 19th to the 20th century. However, one should not 
forget that metaphor and metonymy, generalisation and specialisation, that is, 
synecdoche,  were  at the  core  of the  historical  semantic  research  programme. 
These ‘figures of speech’ were investigated as types of semantic change linked, 
just as today, to types of association processes between ideas, such as similarity 
and contiguity (see Nerlich 1992). Here too, then, one can see a link between the 
past and the present. The next section of this article will however focus entirely 
on  the  present  and  the  future  of  research  into  metaphor,  metonymy,  and 
polysemy.  
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3. The role of metaphor, metonymy and polysemy in research into 
language development and language use 
Metaphor, metonymy and synecdoche are three fundamental ways in which 
language conveys mental representations. They form the three corners of what 
Seto calls ‘the cognitive triangle’ (Seto 1999). Metaphor is based on ‘seeing 
similarities’ (e.g. She is the sun of my life), metonymy is based on ‘exploiting 
connections’  (e.g.  I  am  giving  a  paper),  and  synecdoche  is  based  on 
understanding relations between categories, on ‘understanding class inclusion’ 
(e.g. Give us our daily bread). 
These  three  ‘figures  of  speech’  are  universal  semantic  and  cognitive 
procedures  or  strategies  which  make  it  possible  to  communicate  novel 
experiences effectively. They also give rise to polysemy historically, structure 
meanings  synchronically,  allow  adult  speakers  to  vary  word  meanings 
contextually, and make it possible for children to convey meaning with a very 
restricted set of lexical items at their disposition. 
Semantic development is the process whereby children acquire the lexicon 
inherited from their elders and learn how to use it efficiently. This includes, 
amongst  other  things,  the  acquisition  of  what  one  could  call  a  figurative 
competence which allows children to express new things with the old words they 
have.
2 This process of acquisition changes gradually depending on the number of 
old words children have at their disposition, at first very few, a time when they 
have  to  resort  to  (metaphorically,  metonymically,  and  synecdochically  based) 
over- and underextensions so as to make themselves understood; then more and 
more until the children’s lexicon matches the adults’. In between they learn not 
only how to map the right things and concepts onto the right word-forms and 
vice  versa,  but  also  how  to  see  relations  of  similarity,  contiguity  and  class-
inclusion between things and concepts and how to exploit them in their search 
for the most effective means of linguistic expression and their construal of a 
world (see Nelson et al. 1978). 
Twenty years ago Dan Slobin claimed that the essence of language itself 
can  only  be  discovered  through  a  collaboration  between  developmental 
psycholinguists and historical linguists. Discussing the rhetorical aspects of child 
 
2 Die allgemeine Sprachkompetenz [...] umfasst eine Metaphernkompetenz – die Fähigkeit, 
gewisse sprachliche Gebilde in fast unbeschränkter Fülle produzieren und verstehen zu können 
und  das  Wissen  um  ihre  jeweilige  Angemessenheit  und  Wirkung  in  konkreten 
Kommunikationssituationen.  (Schöffel  1987:57–58).  Mit  dem  Hineinwachsen  in  seine 
Muttersprache erwirbt der Mensch auch die Fertigkeit zu metaphorisieren. Es ist kein Zeichen 
besonderer Sprachmächtigkeit oder hoher sprachlicher Gebildetheit, Metaphern zu schaffen und 
zu  gebrauchen.  Seine  Sprachfähigkeit  ermöglicht  es  jedem  Menschen,  die  metaphorischen 
Potenzen seiner Muttersprache zu nutzen und auszubauen, und zwar ebenso sebstverständlich wie 
alle ihre Leistungen. (Ingendahl 1971: 221) (quoted in Schumacher 1997).  
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language  (Slobin  1977:187),  he  wrote  that  the  first  meanings  to  be  acquired 
should be closest to the child’s non-linguistic strategies for representing events to 
himself. He takes up Eve Clark’s suggestion that such meanings can be regarded 
as cognitively simpler than others (Clark 1973:180) and argues that when a new 
form enters a whole language its range of meaning is likely to be restricted too to 
this cognitively simpler core. The extension of meanings from that core must 
also follow natural cognitive patterns, whether occurring in ontogenesis or in 
other diachronic linguistic processes (Slobin 1977:206–207).  
We claim that these natural patterns are based on metaphor, metonymy, and 
in  less  spectacular  fashion  on  synecdoche.
3  We  also  claim  that  Slobin’s 
programme  of  studying  developmental  psycholinguistics  and  historical 
linguistics jointly has not found any followers to date, at least in the field of 
semantics.  There  is  an  urgent  need  to  study  metaphor  and  metonymy  as 
universal mechanisms of semantic structure, semantic change and semantic 
development. We shall now try to demonstrate what a theory of metonymy can 
contribute to an understanding of certain aspects of language acquisition. 
According to older theories of  metonymy,  metonymy  enables  us to  say 
things quicker, to shorten conceptual and linguistic distances. Instead of saying 
The water in the kettle is boiling, we say The kettle is boiling. Our hypothesis 
was that this function of metonymy as an ‘abbreviation device’ (and to some 
extent  a  type  of  cognitive  and  referential  ellipsis)  can  be  detected  in  child 
language as well as in adult language. Metonymy should be seen as a universal 
strategy of cost-effective communication used by children as well as by adults, 
most  effectively  exploited  in  headlines,  such  as  Brains  at  Science  Museum 
crack Crystal Skull mystery (see Nerlich, Todd & Clarke 1999). 
When  looking  more  closely  at  examples  from  early  language  use  we 
observed that metonymical (as well as metaphorical and synecdochical) relations 
seem to be exploited in overextensions produced by children up to age 2;5. We 
called these ‘compelled metonymical overextensions’ as they are based on the 
fact that at this age a child’s vocabulary, category and conceptual systems are 
still relatively small and unstructured and this scarcity compels them to extend 
already  known  words  to  cope  with  increasing  communicative  demands,  to 
comment  on  what  they  see  and  to  request  what  they  want.  Here  are  some 
examples: 
 
Examples of one-word sentences are taken from (Barrett 1982). 
 
3 We have not looked extensively at synesthesia. One could perhaps say with Marks and 
Bornstein that the structures of synesthetic metaphors that are shown to be present in the earliest 
months  after  birth  would  constitute  Anlagen,  or  primitive  forms,  for  the  plethora  of  more 
sophisticated,  figurative  expressions  we  commonly  encounter  and  create  in  language  and 
literature. (Marks & Bornstein 1987: 64)  
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Wheel: for a wheelbarrow wheel (1;8); a wheelbarrow (1;10); toy wagon/a ring 
(1;11); more appropriate lexical item learned: wheelbarrow (1;11) 
[based on part-whole relationship] 
Choo-choo:  for  trains  (1;7);  bradyscope  (1;9);  airplane/wheelbarrow  (1;10); 
streetcar/a trunk (1;11); more appropriate lexical item learned: airplane (1;11), 
streetcar (1;11), wheelbarrow (1;11) 
 
We also looked at a corpus of two-word utterances collected by Braine (1976). 
In the examples we indicate the metonymical relation that is exploited, as well as 
the illocutionary force of the utterance. 
David (1;9): want pocket.       [container-contained] {request} 
David (1;10): here hello.         [words-object] 
{comment} 
  Situation: indicating or identifying toy telephone 
David (1;10): here more book.       [instrument-action] {request} 
David (1;10): want more spoon.      [instrument-action] {request} 
David (1;10): gimme that blow.      [instrument-action] {request} 
  Situation: wants to blow the match out 
David (1;10): more put in.      [action for place] {request} 
  Situation: has been putting tinker toys in their box, apparently wants to put 
somewhere the pieces the adults are using 
 
Later  on,  when  children  have  acquired  a  sufficient  body  of  words  to 
express  their  more  and  more  complex  needs  and  desires,  together  with  a 
growing body of domain knowledge or world knowledge, they begin to use 
metonymy in a creative way, what we called creative metonymical shrinking. 
As  an  example  we  shall  tell  you  a  meaning  creation  story,  an  approach 
advocated  recently  by  Gerd  Fritz:  Was  praktisch  möglich  ist,  um  die 
Wirklichkeit des Bedeutungswandels besser zu verstehen, ist das Erzählen und 
Betrachten von exemplarischen Kommunikationsgeschichten (Fritz 1998:28). 
Matthew, our son, started school in January 1996. At first we thought he might eat the 
school dinners. But he didn’t like them and insisted on bringing his own lunch box like most of 
his friends do. So in the end we relented and, walking to school in the morning, he brandished 
his lunch box saying to everybody he met: “I love being a lunch box.” Then he thought a bit and 
said: “I love being a  sandwich,  I  really  like being a  sandwich” –  one  could  really  see  the 
metonymical chain extend from his arm through the lunch box to the sandwich and back. What 
he meant by this metonymical utterance was that he liked to be part of the children who were 
allowed  to  bring  a lunch-box  (i.e., a  sandwich)  to  school and  were  not  forced  to have  this 
horrible stuff like potatoes and veg served at the school dinner! 
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Both compelled and creative metonymies are based on semantic strategies 
which  are  not  completely  different  from  adult  communicative  strategies,  of 
which metaphor and metonymy are the most effective (as Ann Dowker says, the 
child does what the adult does: express the inexpressible, see Dowker, in press, 
pp. 8–9), and, we should add: both use similar cognitive and linguistic strategies. 
Let us now look at metaphor as another important communicative strategy 
used by adults and children. As is well known, producing and understanding a 
novel metaphor requires the meaningful integration of two incongruous domains 
of knowledge or experience in a manner not previously considered. How do 
children  acquire  a  metaphoric  competence,  that  is,  the  ability  to  create  and 
understand  metaphors? Two  things  are  required:  knowledge  of  domains  and 
categories,  so  as  to  be  able  to  override  them,  that  is,  to  build  metaphorical 
bridges between them, and an ability to see similarity in dissimilar objects and 
events.  Knowledge  of  domains  increases  naturally  with  a  child’s  growing 
experience of the world – it is, in fact, a life-long task. This life-long acquisition 
of domain knowledge can be illustrated by looking at an example. When reading 
the following sentence in Alison Graham’s column in the Radio Times: The first 
Sarah – Surviving Life focused on the kind of Pop Tart philosophising indulged 
in by the rich and self-absorbed (“A right royal mistake” 24–30 October, 1998, 
p. 148), the reader has to know what a “Pop Tart” is so as to understand the 
metaphor. This type of domain knowledge can only be acquired when you have 
children who pester you to buy this rather disgusting toastable breakfast ‘tartlet’ 
in the supermarket. So, domain knowledge acquisition is a life-long task, but 
what about seeing similarities: how does the ability to see similarity evolve?  
There  seems  to  be  a  developmental  sequence  going  from  compelled 
metonymically or, metaphorically and even synecdochically based overextensions 
to more creative pretend-naming, to the use of similes, to the production and 
then understanding of metaphors. These can be regarded as overlapping stages in 
a child’s semantic development. In overextensions the child explores the ‘space’ 
of conventional categories (as when he or she says “doggy” when pointing to a 
horse); in pretend-naming the child starts to see and use one thing as another 
thing (as when a child picks up a leaf from the ground, puts it between two 
gloves and asks Mummy to “eat the sandwich”); in similes he or she starts to 
verbalise  perceived  similarities  (Mummy,  mummy,  this  chimney  looks  like  a 
giant’s pencil), which sets the child en route for the metaphorical exploitation of 
conceptual similarities between whole incongruous domains of experience, en 
route for a blending of mental spaces, as described in section 2 of this article. 
One  child,  for  example,  called  a  puddle  of  oil  “a  dead  rainbow”.  Our  son 
Matthew said recently that having repeated nightmares is just like an illness, or 
like a virus, only it attacks the mind not the body, but nobody has as yet been 
able to find the right medicine to cure children from nightmares (Matthew, aged 
7;11). Seeing similarities shades gradually into constructing analogies. Creating  
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compelled metaphorical overextensions shades gradually into making creative 
metaphorical leaps. 
Is this true? It has been argued for a long time that overextensions are not 
metaphors (see now Dowker, in press).  
Denken wir uns ein Kind, das an den kleinen Gummiluftballons [...] seine Freude hat [...]; 
dieses Kind, in der Stadt erzogen und wenig mit den Erscheinungen der Natur vertraut, erblickt 
eines Abends zum ersten Male den in nebligem Dunst aufgehenden Mond und sagt bei dessen 
Anblick: ‘Sieh dort oben den schönen Luftballon’! Für den Mond und den Luftballon ist es nicht 
schwer das tertium comparationis zu erkennen; aber von einer Metapher könnte in diesem Falle 
nicht die Rede sein. (Elster 1911:114) 
However, we would argue that metaphor, metonymy, and synecdoche as 
cognitive strategies are present from birth, but they need the child’s interaction 
with  the  world  and  other  human  beings  to  grow  into  the  fully  fledged 
production of metaphors, metonymies and synecdoches as figures of speech. 
In  synecdochical  speaking  and  inferencing  children  explore  the  space  of 
conceptual categories, in metonymical speaking and inferencing children explore 
the  space  of  established  referential  and  semantic  relations,  in  metaphorical 
speaking  and  inferencing  children  discover  novel  relations  and  engage  in 
analogical reasoning – and so do adults. These are all aspects of cognitive and 
semantic learning which continuously structure our understanding of the world 
and of each other. 
Understanding conventional and novel metonymies and metaphors produced 
by others is a different matter again, because children have to integrate domain 
knowledge  that  might  not  match  their  own  developing,  and  to  some  extent 
restricted knowledge of domains. This was illustrated nicely in the following 
example:  “Mutter:  ‘Heute  ist  Landtagswahl,  da  müssen  Papa  und  ich  unsere 
Stimme abgeben.’ Kind: ‘Aber dann könnt ihr ja nicht mehr sprechen!’”, Andreas 
Blank,  p.c.). As  is  common  in  language  acquisition,  there  is  a  lag  between 
production and comprehension of metonymy and metaphor, which also applies 
to the understanding of jokes, riddles and puns. It seems that based on a type of 
(innate?)  ‘figurative  competence’,  children  can  create  metaphorically  and 
metonymically  based  overextensions  and  later  on  creative  metaphors  and 
metonymies  on  the  level  of  parole.  However,  they  still  have  to  ‘learn’  the 
metaphorically  and  metonymically  based  polysemies  which  characterise  a 
language on the level of langue and in various types of discourse – that is, on the 
level of social norms. They also have to learn (in a different sense) to accept that 
adults (whom they normally perceive as rule-imposers and rule-followers) can 
sometimes break the rules and create novel metaphors and metonymies. When 
Brigitte once said to Matthew after he came home from school: Wow, you have 
eaten your whole lunchbox (meaning the contents of the lunchbox), Matthew 
laughed his head off and told her not to be so silly!  
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4. Conclusion 
Investigating the synchronic rhetorical procedures whereby we create new 
meanings from old can sharpen our view for fundamental semantic and cognitive 
processes.  Investigating  diachronic  mechanisms  of  semantic  change  can 
sharpen our view for fundamental semantic and cognitive processes. 
Investigating  the  ways  in  which  children  produce  and  understand  new 
meanings  can  sharpen  our  view  of  how  these  fundamental  semantic  and 
cognitive  abilities  actually  develop.  And  linking  these  three  fields  of 
investigation can advance our theorising in the social and cognitive sciences. 
This  would  provide  a  direct  insight  into  the  linguistic  and  social  roots  of 
cognition and the cognitive roots of linguistic structures. 
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